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THE PATTERN REQUIREMENT IN CIVIL RICO IS WORKING:
CASE LAW AFTER SEDIMA
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of civil suits brought under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)' has risen dramatically since
1980, demonstrating that RICO is realizing its potential as the expansive
and powerful tool Congress intended it to be. 2 This increase in the
number of cases also indicates a potential for abuse of civil RICO in the
hands of overzealous plaintiffs who see it as a federal cause of action for
all seasons. 3 In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., the Supreme Court stated
in dicta that the lower federal courts might curtail perceived abuses of
civil RICO by developing a "meaningful" interpretation of the previ-
ously ignored statutory requirement that the unlawful conduct form a
"pattern of racketeering activity. ' 4 Not surprisingly, what began as a
footnote in Sedima has developed into a large body of case law with a
split among the federal courts of appeals over the correct interpretation
of the pattern requirement. 5 This Note attempts to make sense of the
state of confusion surrounding the pattern requirement in civil RICO by
chronicling the activity in the federal courts of appeals and comparing
the various analyses used to determine when a pattern exists. 6
RICO was enacted by Congress in 1970 for the purpose of seeking
"the eradication of organized crime in the United States."'7 It prohibits
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. 1985). RICO is Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
2. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 n.1 (1985). The
Supreme Court stated: "Of 270 District Court RICO decisions prior to this
year, only 3% (nine cases) were decided throughout the 1970s, 2% were de-
cided in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in 1983, and 43% in 1984." Id.
(citing REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF
CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAw 55 (1985) [hereinafter ABA
REPORT]).
3. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985); see also ABA
REPORT, supra note 2, at 55-69.
4. 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). For a discus-
sion of Sedima, see infra notes 32-54 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the statutory definition of pattern, see infra note 12 and accompanying text.
5. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
6. For an overview of the various interpretations of the pattern require-
ment, see infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the simi-
larities, differences, strengths, and weaknesses of the different interpretations,
see infra notes 144-57 and accompanying text.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1961. According to the statement of findings and purposes:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized-crime
in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-
gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by pro-
(205)
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any "person" from investing in, acquiring an interest in, or conducting
the affairs of an "enterprise" through a "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity." 8 The enterprise can be any group of individuals associated in fact
or any legal entity.9 The statute defines "racketeering activity" in terms
of a long list of crimes, commonly referred to as "predicate acts," which
are the building blocks of RICO violations.' 0 The list of predicate acts
includes state offenses ranging from arson to murder, and federal of-
fenses such as mail, wire and securities fraud.' I "Pattern" is defined in
viding enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those involved in organized crime.
Id.
8. See id. § 1962. This section contains the substantive RICO prohibitions.
Every RICO charge must be based on a violation of at least one of the subsec-
tions of section 1962. See id. Subsection (d) prohibits conspiring to violate sub-
sections (a), (b), or (c), but it is rarely utilized. Subsection (c), which prohibits
conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity,
is the subsection upon which most RICO violations are based. See ABA REPORT,
supra note 2, at 57; see also Sedima, 473 U.S. 479 (§ 1962(c)); Petro-Tech v. West-
ern Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987) (§ 1962(c)); Morgan v. Bank of
Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986) (§ 1962(a) and (c)).
Section 1962 states in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any in-
come derived directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity or through collection of an unlawful debt ...to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or opera-
tion of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racke-
teering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enter-
prise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise ... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly,
in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racke-
teering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962.
RICO defines person as including "any individual or entity capable of hold-
ing a legal or beneficial interest in property." Id. § 1961(3).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961. This section contains definitions. An enterprise is
defined as "[a]ny individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact though not a
legal entity." Id. § 1961; see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590
(1981) (holding that "enterprise" as used in RICO encompasses both legitimate
and illegitimate enterprises).
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). The Supreme Court summarized racketeering
activity as follows: "RICO takes aim at 'racketeering activity'; which it defines as
any act 'chargeable' under several generically described state criminal laws, any
act 'indictable' under numerous federal criminal provisions, including mail and
wire fraud, and any 'offense' involving bankruptcy or securities fraud or drug-
related activities that is 'punishable' under federal law." Sedima, 473 U.S. at 481-
82 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)).
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
2
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the statute as requiring at least two predicate acts within a ten year pe-
riod, 12 although since Sedina, courts have interpreted it to require some-
thing more. 13
In addition to providing criminal penalties and enforcement,'
4
RICO provides a civil remedy which allows plaintiffs to recover treble
damages and attorneys' fees for injuries to business or property as a
result of a RICO violation. 15
The proliferation of cases in the 1980's was accompanied by a per-
ceived misuse of civil RICO against legitimate businesses involved in
garden variety fraud and breach of contract disputes.16 The lower fed-
eral courts responded by enacting various restrictions on the cause of
action. 17 The Supreme Court in Sedima struck down two of these restric-
12. See id. § 1961(5). Section 1961(5) states: " '[P]attern of racketeering
activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred
after the effective date of this chapter [enacted October 15, 1970] and the last of
which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after
the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." Id.
Every substantive violation of RICO requires either a "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity" or "the collection of an unlawful debt." See id. § 1962. Plaintiffs
have rarely based their complaints upon the collection of an unlawful debt and
this Note will therefore not discuss the issue. See ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at
52 n.56.
13. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14 (pattern requires "continuity plus
relationship" among predicate acts); Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First
Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987) (existence of pattern depends on
several factors); Sun Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 193-94 (9th
Cir. 1987) (predicate acts cannot be isolated or sporadic); Morgan v. Bank of
Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986) (predicate acts must be separated
in time and place so that they can be viewed as separate transactions); Superior
Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986) (predicate acts comprising
single scheme do not constitute pattern); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774
F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985) (two predicate acts constitute pattern).
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). The criminal penalties include fines, im-
prisonment, restraining orders and forfeiture of interests acquired in violation
of section 1962. Id.
15. See id. § 1964. To recover in a civil RICO action, the plaintiff must
plead and prove the following elements:
(1) at least two of the predicate acts listed in the statute under "racketeering
activity"; see id. § 1962; see also § 1961(1) (defining "racketeering activity");
(2) the existence of an "enterprise;" see id. § 1962; see also § 1961 (defining "en-
terprise"); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590 (1981) (enterprise can
be legitimate or illegitimate);
(3) a pattern among the predicate acts; see 18 U.S.C. § 1962; see also id. § 1961(5)
(defining pattern); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14 (suggested interpretation of
pattern);
(4) a nexus between the pattern and the enterprise; the defendant must have
invested in, acquired an interest in or conducted the affairs of the enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity; see 18 U.S.C. § 1962; and
(5) an injury to business or property as a result of the RICO violation; see id.
§ 1964(c).
16. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499; see also ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at 55-69.
17. See generally Black, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)-
3
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tions on the grounds that they were not rooted in the language or his-
tory of the statute. 18 The Court called for a broad reading of the
statute, but expressed concern about the "extraordinary" uses of civil
RICO. 19
The Supreme Court attributed the abuses of civil RICO to the wide
range of predicate acts enumerated in the statute as well as to "the fail-
ure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of 'pat-
tern.' -20 Prior to Sedima, most courts required nothing more than proof
of two predicate acts within a ten year period to establish a pattern.2 1
Thus, by criticizing the lower courts for not developing the pattern re-
quirement, the Supreme Court directed them to focus on pattern as a
legitimate means of controlling the civil RICO explosion. In addition,
the court in footnote fourteen of Sedima supplied a suggested interpreta-
tion of "pattern." 2 2 Drawing from the legislative history, the Court
stated that RICO is not aimed at "sporadic activity" and while the stat-
ute "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," two acts may not
be sufficient. 2 3 Moreover, "continuity plus relationship" among the acts is
required to produce a pattern. 24
The federal courts of appeals have recognized the significance of
Securities and Commercial Fraud as Racketeering Crime after Sedima: What is a "Pattern
of Racketeering Activity"?, 6 PACE L. REV. 365 (1986). Among the judicially created
restrictions were requirements that the plaintiff plead a "racketeering injury"
and that the defendant have a "prior criminal conviction," both of which were
invalidated in Sedima. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.
1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). For a discussion of these requirements and
Sedima, see infra notes 32-54 and accompanying text. Some courts required that
the plaintiff show that they were competitively injured in business by the RICO
violation. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); North Barrington Dev. Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211
(N.D. Ill. 1980); see also ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at 292-95. Other courts have
required that in addition to the connection between the pattern and the enter-
prise, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962, the plaintiff had to allege a nexus with organized
crime. See, e.g., Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 642-44 (C.D.
Cal. 1983); Minpeco v. Conticommodities Services Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348, 1351
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at 163-93.
18. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488-500.
19. Id. at 500.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Alexander Grant v. Tiffany, 742 F.2d 408, 410 (8th Cir. 1984),
vacated, 473 U.S. 922 (1985), on remand, 770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980);
United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105
(1975). But see United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1189-
90 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); Exetor Tower Assocs. v.
Bowditch, 604 F. Supp. 1547, 1554-55 (D. Mass. 1985); Teleprompter of Erie,
Inc. v. Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6, 13 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
22. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
23. Id. (emphasis in original).
24. Id. (emphasis in original). For the full text of footnote fourteen of
Sedima, see infra note 42.
208 [Vol. 33: p. 205
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the Supreme Court's comments in Sedima.2 5 Ten circuits have discussed
the pattern requirement in light of Sedima, seven of these have expressly
adopted some version of the Supreme Court's interpretation, and of the
remaining three, only one has declined to follow Sedima.26 The seven
circuits which accept continuity and relationship as the basic definition
of pattern are generally in agreement on what it means for predicate acts
to be related. 27 These courts are, however, widely split over the mean-
ing of continuity, and in effect have created different definitions of
pattern.28
This Note will discuss the impact of Sedima by tracing the split
among the circuits and analyzing and comparing the various interpreta-
tions of the pattern requirement.2 9 It will also compare these interpre-
tations as a means of examining whether it is possible to interpret RICO
broadly, as mandated by the express language of the statute, and at the
same time control civil RICO through a restrictive interpretation of pat-
tern. 30 The conclusion of this Note is that the pattern requirement in
civil RICO is working, at least in those circuits which have developed
restrictive interpretations. Moreover, the most suitable interpretation of
pattern is one which does not treat any one factor as determinative but
rather focuses on the extent of the criminal activity in each case.3
1
25. See Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 38
(3d Cir. 1987) ("The Sedima dictum has been widely viewed as a signal to the
federal courts to fashion a limiting construction of RICO around the pattern
requirement and the concepts of 'continuity' and 'relationship.' ").
26. For a list of the principle cases in which ten federal courts of appeals
have discussed the pattern requirement in light of Sedima, see infra note 55.
27. For a discussion of what it means for predicate acts to be related, see
infra note 56 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the split among the circuits over the pattern require-
ment, see infra notes 55-127 and accompanying text. Some courts and commen-
tators have pointed out a basic difficulty which inheres in the terms "continuity"
and "relationship." Continuity suggests predicate acts which are separated in
time and purpose; relationship suggests predicate acts which are close together.
See Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986); see also
Black, supra note 17, at 380.
29. For a complete discussion of Sedima, see infra notes 32-54 and accompa-
nying text. For an overview of the split among the federal courts of appeals over
the pattern requirement, see infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. For a
comparison of the various interpretations of the pattern requirement, see infra
notes 129-57 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of whether it has been possible for the federal courts of
appeals to reconcile a restrictive interpretation of the pattern requirement with
RICO's liberal construction clause, see infra notes 144-57 and accompanying
text.
31. For a discussion of the most suitable interpretation of pattern, referred
to herein as the flexible approach, see infra notes 74-95, 156-57 and accompany-
ing text.
1988] NOTE 209
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Pattern Issue Arises: Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.
Sedima was the first case in which the United States Supreme Court
discussed civil RICO.3 2 The case involved the issue ofjudicially created
requirements that had to be met in order to maintain a civil RICO ac-
tion.3 3 One requirement was that the plaintiff prove a distinct "racke-
teering injury" to business or property separate from the injury caused
by the predicate acts.3 4 The other requirement was that the defendant
32. See Sedima, 473 U.S. 479 (5-4 decision). Previously, the Supreme Court
had decided two cases involving criminal RICO. See Russello v. United States,
464 U.S. 16, 22 (1983) (insurance proceeds received as result of arson activity
constitute "interest" within meaning of § 1963(a) and are therefore subject to
forfeiture); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590 (1981) (holding that
term "enterprise" used in RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate
enterprises).
The Supreme Court decided another case involving civil RICO on the same
day Sedima was decided. See American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Haroco, 473
U.S. 606, 608 (1986) (rejecting variation of "racketeering injury" requirement).
Since Sedima, the Supreme Court has decided two cases involving civil RICO. See
Agency Holding Corp., et al., v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759
(1987) (four year statute of limitation applicable in Clayton Act civil enforce-
ment applied in civil RICO enforcement action); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2345-46 (1987) (holding that RICO claims are not
excludable from arbitration under Arbitration Act). The impact of Shearson on
the proliferation of civil RICO litigation could be significant since arbitration
agreements are now enforceable under the Arbitration Act as to RICO claims,
and as of 1985, approximately 35% of all RICO claims were based solely or
primarily on allegations of securities fraud. See Shearson, 107 S. Ct. at 2345-46;
ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at 57; Strasser, Prosecutors. Private Bar Find New Uses for
RICO, 10 Nat'l L.J. 36 (Nov. 2, 1987).
33. See Sedima, 473 U.S. 479. The dispute in Sedima had as its origin a joint
venture between Imrex, an American firm, and Sedima, a Belgian firm, to supply
electronic components to another Belgian firm. Id. at 483. Sedima received the
orders, Imrex filled them and shipped them to Europe, and the two firms split
the profits. Id. at 483-84. The agreement worked until Sedima became con-
vinced that Imrex was cheating it by filing inflated expense reports. Id. at 484.
Sedima filed suit in federal district court alleging predicate acts of mail and wire
fraud. Id.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), af'd, 741 F.2d
482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). The district court held that a civil
action under RICO must state a "racketeering injury" distinct from and in addi-
tion to any injury suffered as a result of the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud.
Id. at 965.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
lower court's order. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). The court of appeals also found the complaint defec-
tive on alternative grounds, holding that to state a claim under civil RICO the
plaintiff must allege that the defendant has already been convicted of the predi-
cate acts of mail or wire fraud, or of a RICO violation. Id. at 496.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the proliferation of civil
RICO cases in the appellate courts and because of the variety of approaches
being taken to civil RICO. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 486.
34. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 484.
6
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have a "prior criminal conviction" for the predicate acts or for a RICO
violation. 35 Neither requirement was derived from the language of the
statute.
The Supreme Court invalidated the "prior criminal conviction" re-
quirement on the grounds that it was not supported by the language,
history, or policy of the statute. 36 The Court also invalidated the "rack-
eteering injury" requirement because it was not grounded in the lan-
guage of the statute and because it contravened the general principle
that "RICO is to be read broadly.' 37
Recognizing that the court of appeals' restrictive holding was moti-
vated by a desire to prevent civil RICO from being used against legiti-
mate businesses rather than "mobsters and organized criminals," the
Supreme Court emphasized that in enacting RICO Congress had in-
tended to reach legitimate as well as illegitimate organizations. 3 8 The
Court concluded therefore, that any "defect-if defect it is-is inherent
in the statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress."'3 9
The Court expressed concern about the use of civil RICO predomi-
nantly against legitimate businesses, but stated that this would not jus-
tify the imposition of judicially created restrictions on the statutory
scheme.40 Instead, the Court criticized Congress and the lower federal
35. Id.
36. Id. at 488-93. The Court noted that the Second Circuit had imposed
the "prior criminal conviction" requirement in part to avoid supposed practical
difficulties. Id. at 490. The court of appeals believed that without a prior convic-
tion to rely on, the plaintiff would have to prove the predicate acts beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. This would lead to difficulties because the jury would
have to be given different instructions regarding standards of proof for different
parts of the case. Id. The Supreme Court stated that the predicate acts need not
necessarily be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but it did not decide the issue.
Id. at 491.
37. Id. at 493-500. In regard to its directive that RICO be read broadly, the
Court stated:
This is the lesson not only of Congress' self-consciously expansive lan-
guage and overall approach, see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 586-587 (1981), but also of its express admonition that RICO is to
'be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes,' Pub. L. 91-
452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947. The statute's 'remedial purposes' are no-
where more evident than in the provision of a private action for those
injured by racketeering activity.
Id. at 497-98. For a discussion of Congress' intent that RICO be construed
broadly, see Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
167 (1980).
38. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499.
39. Id.
40. Id. The court stated:
[O]f the 270 known civil RICO cases at the trial court level, 40% in-
volved securities fraud, 37% common law fraud in a commercial or
business setting, and only 9% 'allegations of criminal activity of a type
generally associated with professional criminals.' ABA REPORT, at 55-
56. Another survey of 132 published decisions found that 57 involved
securities transactions and 38 involved commercial and contract dis-
NOTE
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courts for failing "to develop a meaningful interpretation of
'pattern.' "41
In evaluating the meaning of Sedima, a reasonable conclusion is that
the Supreme Court was sending a signal to the lower courts that a more
rigorous interpretation of the pattern requirement would be a legitimate
means of controlling civil RICO. Sedima, however, also stands for the
proposition that any restriction on civil RICO must be grounded in the
language of the statute and consistent with a broad reading of it.
The lower courts were thus presented with the formidable task of
developing an interpretation of "pattern" that would restrict the abuses
of civil RICO but which would avoid the flaws of previous restrictive
interpretations. To assist the lower courts, the Supreme Court in foot-
note fourteen of Sedima supplied a suggested interpretation of the pat-
tern requirement. 4 2 This interpretation focuses on Congress' intent
that the statutory requirement of "at least two acts of racketeering activ-
ity" be only a minimum requirement. 4 3 According to the Court, "while
two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient."' 44 In order to estab-
putes, while no other category made it into double figures. American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, The Authority to Bring Private
Treble Damage Suits Under 'RICO' Should be Removed 13 (Oct. 10, 1984).
Id.
41. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500. The Court attributed the abuses of civil
RICO not only to the failure of Congress and the courts to devise a restrictive
interpretation of the pattern requirement, but also to "the breadth of the predi-
cate offenses, in particular the inclusion of wire, mail, and securities fraud." Id.
42. Id. at 496 n.14. The Court stated:
[T]he legislative history supports the view that two isolated acts of rack-
eteering activity do not constitute a pattern. As the Senate explained:
"The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of
legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeering activ-
ity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor
of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern. S.
REP. No. 91-617, p. 158 (1969) (emphasis added). Similarly, the spon-
sor of the Senate bill, after quoting this portion of the report, pointed
out to his colleagues that "[t]he term 'pattern' itself requires the show-
ing of a relationship .... So, therefore, proof of two acts of racketeer-
ing activity, without more, does not establish a pattern .... ." 116
CONG. REC. 18940 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff) (RICO "not aimed
at the isolated offender"); House Hearings at 665. Significantly, in de-
fining "pattern" in a later provision of the same bill, Congress was
more enlightening: "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces
criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, partici-
pants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated
by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." 18
U.S.C. § 3575(e). This language may be useful in interpreting other
sections of the act. Cf lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789
(1975).
Id. (emphasis in original).
43. Id. For a complete discussion of RICO's legislative history, see Blakey,
The Civil RICO Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 237, 249-80 (1982).
44. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
212 [Vol. 33: p. 205
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lish a pattern, the plaintiff must also demonstrate a showing of "con-
tinuity plus relationship" among the predicate acts.
45
In dissent, Justice Marshall expressed concern that the majority's
broad reading of civil RICO validated the federalization of common law
fraud, traditionally a state concern.4 6 Justice Marshall also stated that
the decision displaced areas of federal law, such as the securities laws, by
providing a more attractive legal remedy. 4 7 Justice Marshall suggested a
resolution of these issues based on a narrow interpretation of RICO and
a requirement that the plaintiff in a civil RICO action allege a distinct
"racketeering injury."' 48
Justice Powell wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he rea-
soned that the Court was not bound to interpret civil RICO so broadly
as to authorize its use against legitimate businesses involved in ordinary
commercial disputes. 49 According to Justice Powell, the words used in
the title of RICO, as well as its legislative history, indicate that it was
intended to be used against organized crime. 50 Justice Powell stated
that the only reason that the statute did not explicitly refer to the Mafia
was Congress' belief that to do so would create an unconstitutional sta-
tus offense. 5'
Justice Powell would have effectuated Congress' intent that RICO
be used only against organized crime by interpreting the pattern re-
quirement narrowly. 52 Justice Powell did, however, agree with the ma-
jority that "continuity plus relationship" among the predicate acts
satisfies the pattern requirement. 5 3 Nevertheless, Justice Powell con-
cluded that the lower courts would be unable to reconcile a broad read-
ing of civil RICO with a restrictive interpretation of the pattern
requirement. 54
45. Id. (emphasis in original).
46. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500-01 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
was joined in his dissent by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Powell.
47. Id. at 505 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 521 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 524 (Powell,J., dissenting). Justice Powell disagreed with the ma-
jority's conclusion that civil RICO must be broadly interpreted. Id. at 529 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting). He distinguished earlier decisions which called for a broad
reading of RICO on the grounds that they involved only its criminal provision.
Id. (Powell. J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 524 (Powell, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (PowellJ., dissenting) (citing 116 CONG. REC. 35343-44 (1970) (re-
marks of Rep. Cellar); 116 CONG. REC. 35344 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff.)).
52. Id. at 529 (Powell, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 525 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
54. Id. (PowellJ., dissenting). The discussion section of this Note explores
whether it has been possible to reconcile a broad reading of civil RICO with a
restrictive interpretation of the pattern requirement. For a discussion of the
strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches of the federal courts of ap-
peals to this difficult problem, see itfra notes 144-57 and accompanying text.
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B. The Federal Courts of Appeals Split Over "Pattern"
After the Supreme Court in Sedima suggested a more restrictive in-
terpretation of the pattern requirement, the lower federal courts strug-
gled to apply the Court's comments in various factual contexts. The
debate which ensued over the pattern requirement has culminated in
several different interpretations of pattern being taken by the federal
courts of appeals. Seven out of ten circuits accept the main proposition
of Sedima's footnote fourteen that in order to establish a pattern there
must be continuity and relationship among the predicate acts. 55 Fur-
thermore, the circuits generally agree that relationship is established by
proof of a common plan, common victims, common perpetrators or
common methods of commission or closeness in time between the
acts. 56 The circuits are split, however, over the meaning of continuity.
There are four basic approaches to the continuity prong of the pat-
tern requirement. One interpretation, referred to here as the two-
scheme approach, requires that the predicate acts be part of at least two
separate criminal schemes. 5 7 Another interpretation, referred to here as
the flexible approach, focuses on the extent of the criminal activity with-
55. See, e.g., Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d
36, 38-40 (3d Cir. 1987); Sun Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187,
191-94 (9th Cir. 1987); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st
Cir. 1987); International Data Bank Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 154-55 (4th
Cir. 1987); Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 927-29 (10th Cir. 1987);
Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 973-77 (7th Cir. 1986); Superior
Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 254-58 (8th Cir. 1986) (following Sedima gener-
ally); see also United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 189-93 (2d Cir. 1986)
(declining to follow Sedima), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987); Bank of Am. v.
Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970-71 (11th Cir. 1986) (acknowledging
Sedima); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985)
(acknowledging Sedima). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 61-127
and accompanying text.
This Note discusses the post-Sedima consideration of the pattern require-
ment in civil RICO by all but two circuits. The Sixth Circuit has not yet had an
opportunity to discuss the pattern requirement in light of Sedima. The Sixth Cir-
cuit has, however, recently discussed the pattern requirement in connection with
the prohibition against conspiring to violate RICO, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)
(1982), but it expressed no opinion on what constitutes a pattern in the ordinary
case. See United States v.Joseph, 835 F.2d 1149,1152 (6th Cir. 1987). The D.C.
Circuit has acknowledged the Supreme Court's comments in Sedima but has not
yet had an opportunity to apply them. See Berg v. First Am. Bankshares, Inc.,
796 F.2d 489, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
56. See, e.g., Sun Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 192 (9th
Cir. 1987) (relationship exists among predicate acts that have "the same or simi-
lar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or other-
wise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics"); Morgan v. Bank of
Waukegan, 804 F.2d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 1986) ("relationship implies that the
predicate acts were committed somewhat closely in time to one another, involve
the same victim, or involve the same type of misconduct").
57. For a discussion of the two-scheme approach, which is utilized by the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits, see infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
214
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out relying on a single determinative factor. 58 The third interpretation
holds that predicate acts are continuous and thus constitute a pattern if
they are not "isolated or sporadic." This approach is referred to here as
the not-isolated approach. 59 The final group is those circuits which ad-
here to the pre-Sedima view that any two acts can constitute a pattern.
60
All these approaches are discussed below.
1. The Two-Scheme Approach (Eighth and Tenth Circuits)
The two-scheme approach is based upon the formulation of con-
tinuity and relationship articulated in Sedima.6 1 To satisfy the pattern
requirement under this approach, the predicate acts must be related and
must comprise more than one criminal scheme.6 2 If both requirements
are not fulfilled, then the complaint will be dismissed for lack of a
pattern.
a. Eighth Circuit
In Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit adopted the two-scheme approach. 6 3 The defendants
in Superior Oil were involved in a single scheme to steal gas from an oil
company. 64 Since there was no proof that they had engaged in this ac-
tivity in the past or were presently engaged in it elsewhere, the court
held that the pattern element was not established and dismissed the
RICO claim.6 5 In cases subsequent to Superior Oil, the Eighth Circuit has
58. For a discussion of the flexible approach, which is utilized by the Third,
Fourth and Seventh Circuits, see infra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
59. For a discussion of the not-isolated approach, utilized by the First and
Ninth Circuits, see infra notes 96-111 and accompanying text.
60. For a discussion of the pre-Sedima approach, taken by the Second, Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits, see infra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
61. See Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 254-57 (8th Cir. 1986)
(citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14). For the facts of Superior Oil, see infra note
64 and accompanying text.
62. See Superior Oil, 785 F.2d at 257.
63. Id. at 257 (citing Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615
F. Supp. 828, 832 (D.C. Ill. 1985)). Prior to Superior Oil, the leading case for the
two-scheme approach was Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., which
was also the first case to adopt the Supreme Court's suggestion in Sedinma that
pattern is a separate element of a RICO claim. Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare v.
Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828 (D.C. Ill. 1985). The two-scheme approach pro-
pounded by the district court in Northern Trust, however, was never adopted by
the Seventh Circuit. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's approach and its
rejection of the two-scheme approach, see infra notes 76-83 and accompanying
text.
64. Superior Oil, 785 F.2d at 253-55. An employee and two others stole liq-
uid petroleum from Superior Oil's pipeline. Id. Acts of mail and wire fraud
were committed in the course of obtaining the oil from the pipeline and in filing
fraudulent reports regarding the pressure at the well. Id. at 257.
65. Id. at 257-58. Conversely, the court stated that "it may be that proof of
a threat of continuing racketeering activities in the future could, in combination
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consistently upheld the requirement of two schemes.
66
b. Tenth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has not
yet spoken definitively of the pattern issue but in several cases has used a
method resembling the two-scheme approach to determine that a pat-
tern was not stated. 67 In Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick the Tenth Circuit ac-
with ongoing acts of racketeering be sufficient to establish a 'pattern of racke-
teering.' " Id. at 257.
It is worth noting that the court characterized the activity at hand as "one
continuing scheme." Id. Apparently the court found some continuity present
but not enough to establish a pattern.
66. See Terre Du Lac Ass'n, Inc. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 834 F.2d 148 (8th
Cir. 1987) (alleged predicate acts of mail fraud relating to development of parcel
of property constituted single fraudulent scheme to market property; therefore
no pattern); United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 858 (8th Cir. 1987) (pat-
tern was stated where evidence indicated that there were three separate schemes
involving illicit drugs which involved different drugs, suppliers, countries and
bases of operations); H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648, 650
(8th Cir. 1987) (pattern not stated where complaint alleged series of fraudulent
acts committed in furtherance of single scheme to influence commissioners of
public utility commission); Allright Mo., Inc. v. Billeter, 829 F.2d 631, 641 (8th
Cir. 1987) (limited partner's allegations that general partner illegally transferred
land to third party were insufficient to establish pattern even though acts oc-
curred over several years and were directed against several individuals and enti-
ties in limited partnership where only single scheme to deprive limited partners
of interest was shown); Ornest v. Delaware N. Cos., 818 F.2d 651, 652 (8th Cir.
1987) (owners of sports arena failed to state pattern in RICO claim that opera-
tors of concessions defrauded arena owners and predecessors over eight year
period of contractual share of vending machine sales where only single scheme
was shown and no allegation was made that operators had engaged in similar
activities in past or were engaged in other criminal activities elsewhere); Madden
v. Gluck, 815 F.2d 1163, 1164 (8th Cir.) (single scheme to keep corporation
afloat in order to loot corporation did not establish pattern even though alleged
acts included checkkiting, diversion of corporate assets and defrauding of credi-
tors), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 86 (1987); Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc.,
805 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir. 1986) (investor's allegations that securities broker-
age firm and its employee generated excessive sales commissions by recom-
mending unsuitable investments and churning investor's account failed to
establish pattern because it consisted of only single scheme); Holmberg v. Mor-
risette, 800 F.2d 205, 209-10 (8th Cir. 1986) (pattern not stated where drawing
down of three letters of credit securing exportation of goods constituted single
scheme), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1953 (1987).
67. See Garbade v. Great Divide Mining and Milling Corp., 831 F.2d 212,
214 (10th Cir. 1987) (where majority shareholder made several secret withdraw-
als from corporate income in attempt to have loan he made to company repaid
out of company funds and had single objective, pattern not stated); Condict v.
Condict, 815 F.2d 579, 582-84 (10th Cir. 1987) (allegations of common law
fraud, deceit and misrepresentation arising from family dispute over family
ranching operations failed to state pattern); Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d
925, 928-29 (10th Cir. 1987) (allegations that corporation's directors secretly
purchased real property and sold it at profit to corporation failed to establish
pattern where there was no indication that activity was other than isolated inci-
dent and single scheme at issue had one victim and one goal).
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cepted continuity plus relationship as the basis of the pattern
requirement. 6 8 Furthermore, the Torwest court held that the numerous
racketeering acts in question did not evince continuity because "a
scheme to achieve a single discrete objective does not of itself create a
threat of ongoing activity, even when that goal is pursued by multiple
illegal acts, because the scheme ends when the purpose is accom-
plished." 6 9 Although this proposition may seem to be merely a recapit-
ulation of the two-scheme approach as set forth by the Eighth Circuit in
Superior Oil,70 the Torwest court declined "to go beyond the facts before
us to formulate a bright-line test in the abstract." 7 1 While the Tenth
Circuit has affirmed the use of this modified two-scheme approach in
cases subsequent to Torwest, 72 it is unclear whether the method will be
retained in a potential future case which presents a high level of con-
tinuity but only a single scheme, such as is the case with an ongoing or
68. 810 F.2d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 1987). The court reviewed the Supreme
Court's comments in Sedima and stated that "Sedima thus makes clear that a
RICO violation requires continuous and related racketeering acts." Id. The
court found the relationship aspect satisfied because the acts were part of a
"common fraudulent scheme." Id. (citing Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d
252 (8th Cir. 1986)). The case involved two corporations, Vace and Great-West,
which formed a new corporation, Torwest, to engage in the business of acquir-
ing and developing real estate. Id. at 926. Instead of finding property for acqui-
sition by Torwest as agreed, Vace secretly bought land and sold it to Torwest at
an inflated price. Id. at 927. The court assumed for purposes of the ruling that
the defendants had engaged in numerous acts of racketeering. Id. at 928.
69. Id. at 928-29. The court refused to characterize the activity in question
as "a scheme that contemplated open ended fraudulent activity over a period of
time." Id. at 929. Instead, the court determined that the scheme at issue had a
single goal and that there was no evidence on which to suppose that the activity
would continue after the goal was achieved. Id. Thus, no threat of continuing
activity could be inferred. Id.
70. See Superior Oil, 785 F.2d at 257. In a subsequent case the Tenth Circuit
declared its approach "similar" to that of other courts, including the classic ex-
positions of the two-scheme approach, Superior Oil and Northern Trust
Bank/O'Hare v. Inryco. See Condict v. Condict, 815 F.2d 579, 584 n.3 (10th Cir.
1987). For a discussion of Superior Oil, Northern Trust and the two-scheme ap-
proach in the Eighth Circuit, see infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
71. Id.; see also Garbade v. Great Divide Mining and Milling Corp., 831 F.2d
212, 214 (10th Cir. 1987). In Garbade the court suggested that a different test
might be applied for determining what constitutes a pattern as opposed to what
does not constitute a pattern. The court stated that "Torwest decided what was
not a pattern of racketeering activity, as did Condict v. Condict, 815 F.2d 579
(10th Cir. 1987) We will do the same and again not attempt to construct an
affirmative definition of what would constitute such a pattern." Garbade, 831
F.2d at 214 (emphasis in original).
72. See Garbade v. Great Divide Mining and Milling Corp., 831 F.2d 212,
214 (10th Cir. 1987) (where majority shareholder made several secret withdraw-
als from corporate income in attempt to have loan he made to company repaid
out of company funds and had single objective, pattern not stated); Condict v.
Condict, 815 F.2d 579, 582-84 (10th Cir. 1987) (allegations of common law
fraud, deceit and misrepresentation arising from family dispute over family
ranching operations failed to state pattern).
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open ended scheme. 73
2. The Flexible Approach (Seventh, Third and Fourth Circuits)
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Third and
Fourth Circuits have rejected the two-scheme approach7 4 in favor of a
flexible analysis which does not turn on any one factor or any verbal
formula but rather focuses on the facts and circumstances of each
case. 75 The methods used by these circuits are similar but not identical.
73. In Torwest, the court rejected the plaintiff-appellant's argument that it
was presented with such a case. 810 F.2d at 929. The implication is that the
case may have been decided differently if the scheme at issue was open ended or
continuous. If so, this would have been a substantial deviation from the two-
scheme approach of Superior Oil, where no pattern was held to be established
despite the existence of "one continuing scheme." See Superior Oil, 785 F.2d at
257.
A future rejection by the Tenth Circuit of the two-scheme approach, how-
ever, would be consistent with the treatment given to the two-scheme approach
by other circuits in similar circumstances. The Third Circuit for example, prior
to rejecting the two-scheme approach, used that approach to demonstrate that a
pattern was established in a situation which demonstrated a high level of con-
tinuity. See Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1354-55
(3d Cir. 1987) (fraud involving services for eighty oil wells performed pursuant
to two contracts covering different time periods constituted more than one
scheme). When later presented with a marginal case of continuity, however, the
Third Circuit rejected the two-scheme approach and adopted another approach.
See Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 38-40 (3d
Cir. 1987) (investment fraud scheme carried out by several individuals and two
separate entities and which involved similar misrepresentations to more than 20
investors constituted pattern despite existence of single scheme). For a discus-
sion of the Third Circuit's approach, see infra notes 84-90 and accompanying
text.
74. All three circuits have rejected the two-scheme approach on the
grounds that it would allow a large and ongoing single scheme to escape RICO
liability. See Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39
(3d Cir. 1987); International Data Bank Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th
Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986).
For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of the two-scheme ap-
proach, see infra note 84.
The Seventh Circuit's rejection of the two-scheme approach in Morgan v.
Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d at 975, was a major setback for the two-scheme
approach because the district court decision in the same case, Morgan v. Bank of
Waukegan, 615 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Il1. 1985) (Shadur, J.), rev'd, 804 F.2d 970
(7th Cir. 1986), was a companion case to Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare v. In-
ryco, 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Il. 1985) (Shadur, J.), the progenitor of the two-
scheme approach. The two-scheme approach was thereby abandoned in the
Seventh Circuit. For a discussion of Morgan and Northern Trust, see Batista, 7th
Circuit Complicates RICO Defense, 9 Nat'l LJ. 15 (June 8, 1987).
75. See, e.g., Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d
36, 40 (3d Cir. 1987) ("We decline to adopt a verbal formula for determining
when unlawful activity is sufficiently extensive to be 'continuous.' "); Interna-
tional Data Bank Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987) ("In our view,
no mechanical test can determine the existence of a RICO pattern."); Morgan v.
Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 976 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The doctrinal require-
ment of a pattern is a standard, not a rule, and as such its determination de-
[Vol. 33: p. 205
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The differences have to do with the articulation of specific factors and
the factual circumstances in which the cases arose. However, the meth-
ods of analyzing the pattern requirement in civil RICO claims are suffi-
ciently similar to be considered as one general approach.
a. Seventh Circuit
In the Seventh Circuit the flexible approach was set forth in Morgan
v. Bank of Waukegan.76 To establish a pattern under this approach the
predicate acts must demonstrate both continuity and relationship. 77 To
satisfy the continuity prong the predicate acts must be sufficiently dis-
tinct from each other in time and place so as to be considered "separate
transactions."7 8 The Morgan court listed as factors to be used in deter-
mining whether separate transactions exist "the number and variety of
predicate acts and the length of time over which they were committed,
the number of victims, the presence of separate schemes and the occur-
rence of distinct injuries." 79 No one of these factors is to be considered
determinative, rather the facts and circumstances of each case must be
taken into account.8 0
The continuity and relationship aspects of pattern were satisfied in
Morgan because the predicate acts took place over a period of several
pends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, with no one factor
being necessarily determinative."). For a discussion of Zepkin, see infra notes 91-
95 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Morgan, see infra notes 76-83 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Barticheck, see infra notes 84-90 and ac-
companying text.
76. 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986). The facts in Morgan involved misrepre-
sentations made to the plaintiffs for the purpose of inducing them to invest in a
series of corporations and two subsequent foreclosure sales which occurred two
years apart. Id. at 972. The episode was facilitated by various acts of mail fraud
committed over a four year period. Id. at 973.
In a previous case the Seventh Circuit had recognized that the purpose of
the pattern requirement is "to limit RICO to those cases in which racketeering
acts are committed in a manner characterizing the defendant as a person who
regularly commits such crimes." Lipin Enters., Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324
(7th Cir. 1986) (citing ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at 203-08 (1985)).
77. Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975. The court noted that the aspects of continuity
and relationship may sometimes be difficult to reconcile with each other; rela-
tionship implies that the acts occurred closely in time to each other and con-
tinuity implies acts occurring at different points in time. Id.
78. Id. Relationship among the acts, the other prong of the Sedima pattern
formulation, "implies that the predicate acts were committed somewhat closely
in time to one another, involve the same victim, or involve the same type of
misconduct." Id. The author submits that it is the rare case in which the rela-
tionship aspect is not met. In virtually all of the cases involving the pattern issue
it is the continuity aspect which is in controversy.
79. Id. The court described this approach as a "middle course" between
two extremes. Id. The two extremes are represented by the two-scheme ap-
proach and by the pre-Sedima view, still held by some courts, that mere commis-
sion of two predicate acts within a ten year period suffices for a pattern. Id.
80. Id.; see also Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 810 (7th
Cir. 1987).
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years and were distinct in that they related to two separate foreclosures
and a fraudulent loan transaction. 81 Since Morgan, the Seventh Circuit
has had an opportunity to apply the flexible approach several times and
has held that continuity is not shown where the predicate acts merely
lead up to or further a single illegal transaction. 8 2 But a pattern does
exist where each predicate act in a series inflicts economic injury, even
though there is but a single scheme and a single victim. 83
b. Third Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted
the flexible approach in Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First National
State but with a conceptual framework slightly different from that em-
ployed by the Seventh Circuit. 84 Rather than characterizing predicate
81. Morgan, 804 F.2d at 976. The Morgan court reexamined two previous
post-Sedima pattern cases in light of its new method. Id. Illinois Department of
Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985), involved a defendant who
mailed nine fraudulent sales tax returns in nine consecutive months. The panel
hearing the appeal decided the case on the basis of the pre-Sedima view that each
mailing was a separate offense and that all that was required for a pattern was
more than one predicate act within a ten year period. The Morgan court ana-
lyzed this activity as nine separate transactions. Morgan, 804 F.2d at 976. In
Lipin Enterprises Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986), the defendant
allegedly defrauded the plaintiff out of $960,000 worth of stock in one transac-
tion. The court held that no pattern was stated, despite multiple predicate acts,
because the activity only comprised one scheme or episode. Id. The Morgan
court analyzed this as a single transaction, single scheme, single victim and sin-
gle injury, all of which transpired over a short period of time. Thus, the con-
tinuity prong was not satisfied. Morgan, 804 F.2d at 976-77.
82. See Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 1987)
(false representations leading up to single contract and transfer of single busi-
ness opportunity did not constitute pattern); Marks v. Forster, 811 F.2d 1108,
1112 (7th Cir. 1987) (no pattern stated where accountants participated in
scheme to divert capital from partnership by twice mailing false tax schedules,
filing false tax return and denying information to investor); Elliott v. Chicago
Motor Club Ins., 809 F.2d 347, 350 (7th Cir. 1986) (allegations that insurance
company engaged in scheme to delay settlement of claim did not state pattern
where all predicate acts related to same transaction involving single insurance
policy and arising out of single automobile accident); Tellis v. U.S. Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 826 F.2d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 1986) (fraudulent mailings by employer
to induce employee to settle worker's compensation claim did not amount to
pattern).
83. See Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987). Liquid
Air involved an employee of the company and two representatives of a distribu-
tor who bilked the company out of cylinders for compressed gas as well as the
rental and replacement fees for the cylinders by falsifying 19 shipping orders.
The court held that repeated infliction of economic injury upon a single victim
through a single scheme was sufficient to establish a pattern. Id.; cf. Illinois
Dep't of Rev. v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 1985) (nine fraudulent sales
tax returns in nine consecutive months satisfies pattern).
84. 832 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1987). For the facts of Barticheck, see infra note 89
and accompanying text.
In several previous cases the Third Circuit dealt with the pattern issue with-
out adopting a specific approach. Instead, since each case presented a series of
16
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acts as "continuous" and "related," the Third Circuit interprets pattern
directly based "on a combination of different factors such as the number
of unlawful acts, the length of time over which the acts were committed,
the similarity of the acts, the number of victims, the number of perpetra-
tors and the character of the unlawful activity." 8 5 The Third Circuit
treats continuity, which the Supreme Court emphasized in Sedima and
which was drawn from RICO's legislative history,8 6 as merely calling for
an inquiry into the extent of the illegal activity. 8 7 However, the Third
Circuit does not use a verbal formula for determining when activity is
sufficiently extensive to constitute a pattern, instead it looks to the facts
and circumstances of each case.8 8
Thus, in Barticheck a pattern existed where several individuals and
two separate entities made misrepresentations to more than twenty in-
vestors in furtherance of a single fraudulent scheme.8 9 In a subsequent
acts which satisfied the two-scheme approach, the most rigorous test for a pat-
tern, the RICO claims were allowed to stand. See Town of Kearney v. Hudson
Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 829 F.2d 1263, 1267-68 (3d Cir. 1987) (two
separate schemes to bribe city officials); Petro-Tech Inc. v. Western Co. of N.
Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1354-55 (3d Cir. 1987) (fraud involving services for eighty
oil wells performed pursuant to two contracts covering different time periods);
United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 289-90 (3d Cir. 1986) (seven racketeer-
ing acts, performed over period of more than year, involving manufacture, dis-
tribution and sale of methamphetamine and phencyclidine), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 927 (1987); Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341, 353
n.20 (3d Cir. 1986) (fraudulent termination of insurance agencies in several cit-
ies), aff'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987).
In Barticheck the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
jected the two-scheme approach not only because of the definitional problems
presented by the term scheme, but also because it would allow a large and ongo-
ing single scheme to escape RICO liability. See Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 39. The
latter reason for rejecting the two-scheme approach is somewhat inconsistent
with the Third Circuit's treatment of it in a previous case where rather than
allow a large and ongoing single scheme to escape liability, the court read the
term scheme expansively and used the two-scheme approach, without adopting
it, to hold that a pattern existed. See Petro-Tech Inc., 824 F.2d at 1355.
85. Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 38-39.
86. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14 (citing S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 158 (1969)).
87. Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 40. This inquiry into the extent of the illicit activ-
ity is consistent with the purpose of RICO, which is to reach "criminal activity
that, because of its organization, duration, and objectives poses, or during its
existence posed, a threat of a series of injuries over a significant period of time."
See Marshall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel, 835 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1987).
88. Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 40; see also, Marshall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel,
835 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1987).
89. Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 39. Barticheck involved various entities and indi-
viduals which formed a limited partnership to engage in oil and gas drilling and
which arranged with Garden State National Bank to have the Bank lend money
to investors. Id. at 37. The Bank authorized the organizers to process the loan
applications. Id. The organizers then approached the plaintiffs, 23 investors,
and made material misrepresentations regarding the safety of the investment.
Id. As a result the plaintiffs borrowed over two million dollars to invest in the
venture. Id. Their interests later proved to be worthless and they charged that
17
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Third Circuit case, however, no pattern was held to exist where there
were two perpetrators but only a single victim, a single injury and a sin-
gle scheme over a short period of time. 90
c. Fourth Circuit
In International Data Bank Ltd. v. Zepkin, the Fourth Circuit adopted a
flexible approach to the pattern requirement, declining to adopt a single
test or formula.9 ' It described its method as "a case by case standard
akin to that announced by the Seventh Circuit in Morgan."9 2 Under this
approach, the existence of a pattern is a matter of "criminal dimension
and degree."'9 3 While the Fourth Circuit has not set forth a list of spe-
cific factors, it has made clear that the existence of a pattern depends on
the context in which the alleged illegal activity took place and especially
on the nature of the predicate offenses. 94
the organizers were acting as agents of the Bank. Fidelity Union Bank later be-
came the successor to Garden State Bank. Id.
The court stated that this activity comported with the ordinary understand-
ing of the term "pattern" and properly fell within the reach of civil RICO. Id.
90. See Marshall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel, 835 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1987).
The defendants in Marshall-Silver were subcontractors on a job for which Mar-
shall-Silver was the contractor. Id. When Marshall-Silver did not pay them the
subcontractors filed to have Marshall-Silver put into involuntary bankruptcy and
contacted financial reporting services to report the bankruptcy. Id. The subcon-
tractors dropped the bankruptcy suit when required to post a bond. Id. Mar-
shall-Silver subsequently sued on RICO charges. Id.
In dismissing the case for lack of a pattern, the court compared it to two
Seventh Circuit cases decided under the flexible approach. Id. (citing Marks v.
Forster, 811 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1987); Lipin Enters., Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322
(7th Cir. 1986)).
91. 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987). Zepkin involved RICO charges by inves-
tors against the ousted founders of a business who allegedly made fraudulent
statements in the prospectus, falsified the amount of their advance to the com-
pany and fraudulently obtained reimbursement. Id. at 150-51. The court held
that no pattern was stated in this single scheme to defraud and that all that ex-
isted were ordinary claims of fraud, not RICO claims. Id. at 154-55. Further-
more, the court rejected the two-scheme approach and any method that relied
on the number of predicate acts involved. Id. The court stated that "[n]o
mechanical test can determine the existence of a pattern." Id.
92. See HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 828 F.2d 1071, 1073 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 706 (1988). For a discussion of Walsey, see infra note 94 and
accompanying text.
93. See Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 155.
94. See HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 828 F.2d 1071, 1073 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 706 (1988). In Walsey, the plaintiffs bought property bordering
a parcel owned by the defendant's and sued on RICO charges alleging that the
defendants, through a series of misrepresentations, tricked the state and local
governments into granting numerous zoning benefits for their parcel while plac-
ing zoning burdens on the plaintiffs' parcel. Id. at 1072. This activity took place
over a four year period. Id. The court held that no pattern existed in this situa-
tion despite the length of time and large number of predicate acts alleged. Id. at
1075. The court's reasoning was that the context of this situation, a mixed com-
mercial and political process which is by its nature complex and lengthy, ac-
18
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To date the Fourth Circuit has concentrated on what is not a pat-
tern. It is clear that a single scheme to defraud a single victim is not a
pattern.9 5 However, the Fourth Circuit has not had an opportunity to
define what is a pattern.
3. The "Not-Isolated" Approach (Ninth and First Circuits)
The Ninth and First Circuits employ similar methods for determin-
ing the existence of a civil RICO pattern. Both circuits accept the Sedima
dicta that something more than just two acts is required to establish a
pattern; there must be a "threat of continuing activity." '96 Rather than
focus specifically on the standard of "continuity plus relationship" enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court, however, as the majority of circuits have
done,9 7 the Ninth and First Circuits frame the inquiry in terms of
whether the predicate acts are "isolated" and therefore do not rise to
the level of a pattern.98
a. Ninth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit defined
the contours of the pattern requirement in Sun Savings and Loan Associa-
tion v. Dierdorff.9 9 The Ninth Circuit's approach to the pattern require-
ment is unique because it follows the Sedima suggestion that something
more than two acts is required to establish a pattern,1 0 0 but maintains
counted for the large number of predicate acts over a span of time. Id. at 1074-
75. The court noted that in a purely commercial context a lengthy scheme
might contribute to the finding of a pattern. Id. at 1075. Furthermore, the court
emphasized that its holding did not mean that it was impossible to have a RICO
claim in a zoning context. Id.
95. See Eastern Publishing & Advertising v. Chesapeake Publishing & Ad-
vertising, 831 F.2d 488, 492 (4th Cir. 1987) (RICO action by publisher against
competitor for multiple acts of mail and wire fraud in misleading customers to
advertise with competitor did not state pattern); Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 154 (suit by
investors against ousted founders of business alleging fraudulent statements in
prospectus and fraudulent reimbursement did not state pattern).
96. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
97. For an overview of the various approaches to the pattern requirement
taken by the circuits, see supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Sun Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 191-94
(9th Cir. 1987); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1987).
For a discussion of Roeder and the First Circuit's approach, see infra notes 108-11
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Sun Savings and the Ninth Circuit's
approach, see infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
99. 825 F.2d 187, 191-94 (9th Cir. 1987). Sun Savings involved the former
president of a bank who had allegedly received a series of kickbacks and favors
from loan customers of the bank. Id. at 190. The bank sued on civil RICO
charges alleging four predicate acts of mail fraud based on letters the president
sent to various entities fraudulently concealing his illicit activities. Id.
100. See id. at 191 (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14). Three months
prior to its decision in Sun Savings, the Ninth Circuit had expressly declined to
follow the Supreme Court's suggestion in Sedima that a pattern requires some-
thing more than just two predicate acts. See California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Fran-
1988] NOTE 223
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that the Supreme Court did not intend to establish " 'continuity plus
relationship' as a determinative two-pronged test."'' Rather, the
Ninth Circuit's approach is premised on the conclusion that the
Supreme Court used that formulation "to demonstrate how the pattern
requirement should be interpreted to prevent the application of RICO
to the perpetrators of 'isolated' or 'sporadic' criminal acts." 102
Therefore, instead of defining "pattern" through the use of extra-
neous criteria such as the number of schemes or the extent of the con-
tinuity,' 0 3 the Sun Savings court held that a RICO pattern requires
predicate acts which are not "isolated or sporadic."i ° 4 The court rea-
soned, furthermore, that this determination depends upon whether the
predicate acts pose "a threat of continuing activity." 1° 5 While the court
ciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 698
(1988). The court in Franciscan stated: "The dictum in Sedima is suggestive, but
without additional explication by the Supreme Court we decline to follow its
lead." Id. at 1469. Thus, the court held that two or more acts of racketeering
activity constitute a pattern. Id. In Sun Savings the court offered no explanation
for its different interpretation of the pattern requirement.
101. Sun Savings, 825 F.2d at 192 (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14
(emphasis omitted)).
102. Id. at 192 (citing Note, Reconsideration of Pattern in Civil RICO Offenses, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 83, 96 (1986)); see also Medallion Television Enter., Inc. v.
SelecTV, 833 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987).
103. The court emphasized that the requirement of "continuity" stressed in
Sedima is designed to prevent RICO from being used against "perpetrators of
isolated or sporadic acts" and not to limit it to "complicated systems or multiple
schemes of criminal activity." Sun Savings, 825 F.2d at 193-94. The Ninth Cir-
cuit in Sun Savings concluded that, furthermore, courts should not create limita-
tions upon RICO claims which are not found in the statute. See id. (citing Sedima,
473 U.S. at 499-500).
104. Sun Savings, 825 F.2d at 194. While the Ninth Circuit framed its in-
quiry in terms of acts which are "not isolated or sporadic," it did not dismiss the
formulation of continuity and relationship as irrelevant. Id. at 192; see also Me-
dallion Television Enter., Inc. v. SelecTV, 833 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987) ("those
factors are relevant considerations"). Thus, the Sun Savings court declared that
predicate acts which are not "isolated or sporadic" demonstrate that the crimi-
nal activity is "continuous." 825 F.2d at 192. According to the court, the ele-
ment of continuity is most often in controversy in cases involving the pattern
requirement. Id.
In addition to examining the continuity factor, the court accepted the
Supreme Court's determination that relationship exists "among acts that have
'the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of com-
mission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics.' " Sun
Savings, 825 F.2d at 192 (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575(e). The predicate acts in the case at hand demonstrated relationship be-
cause they all furthered the same scheme. Sun Savings, 825 F.2d at 191.
105. Sun Savings, 825 F.2d at 193. In a later case the Ninth Circuit ex-
plained that its inquiry posits the issue as "whether the acts are isolated or spo-
radic, on the one hand, or whether they indicate a threat of continuing activity,
on the other." Medallion Television Enter., Inc. v. SelecTV, 833 F.2d 1360,
1365 (9th Cir. 1987). The court admitted that its approach "does not provide a
bright-line rule" but reasoned that application of the test would become easier
when more cases were decided on the basis of it. Id. at 1365.
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss1/5
1988] NOTE 225
did not define this phrase, it held that the criminal activity at hand posed
such a threat because the four predicate acts covered up a series of ille-
gal kickbacks and receipts of favors, occurred over a period of several
months and did not complete the criminal scheme. 10 6 In subsequent
cases the Ninth Circuit has found no threat of continuing activity where
the predicate acts implement a single criminal objective, except where
the objective is an ongoing one; relevant factors considered in those
cases included the number of victims and the amount of time over which
the activity took place.
10 7
b. First Circuit
Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc. is the only case to date in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has discussed the
pattern issue. 10 8 In Roeder, the court held that predicate acts must be
related and "must threaten to be more than an isolated occurrence" in
order to establish a pattern. 10 9 Furthermore, the Roeder court recog-
nized that there is a point at which acts become so close in time and
106. The Sun Savings court demonstrated the meaning of "threat of contin-
uing activity" by comparing the facts at hand to those of Schreiber Distributing Co.
v. Serv-Well Furniture Co. Sun Savings, 825 F.2d at 193 (citing Schreiber Distrib.
Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1986)). In Schreiber, the
two predicate acts at hand "did not pose a threat of continuing activity because
they furthered the diversion of a single shipment of goods and appear[ed] to
have occurred at nearly the same time, and because once the acts were com-
plete[d], defendant had no further need to commit predicate acts." Id. For a
discussion of the Ninth Circuit's application of "threat of continuing activity" in
subsequent cases, see infra note 108 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., United Energy Owners v. United Energy Management, 837
F.2d 356, 361 (9th Cir. 1988) (multiple acts involving multiple victims over more
than year satisfy pattern requirement); Medallion Television Enter., Inc. v.
SelecTV, 833 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987) (no threat of continuity where case in-
volved single fraud with single victim); Jarvis v. Regan, 833 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1987) (no threat of continuity where legal aid organization allegedly committed
three predicate acts of mail and wire fraud in obtaining single federal grant to
defray cost of opposing ballot initiative); Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826
F.2d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1987) (13 acts of fraud related to ongoing scheme to
embezzle company funds involving multiple victims established pattern).
108. 814 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1987). The plaintiff in Roeder was a stock-
holder in Alpha Industries, Inc. who brought a class action suit under the securi-
ties laws and under RICO against the officers and directors of the corporation
alleging that the defendants were liable for not disclosing that Alpha had paid a
bribe for a contract. Id. at 23-24. The alleged predicate acts were eleven.phone
calls and eight letters sent in the course of making three payments on a single
bribe. Id. at 31.
109. Id. at 30.. The court did not explain the meaning of "isolated" or fur-
ther define its conception of the pattern requirement. The Roeder court rejected
the two-scheme approach as a definition of pattern on the ground that it substi-
tutes the difficulty of defining "scheme" for the difficulty in defining "pattern."
Id. Furthermore, the court disavowed the two-scheme approach because it
would allow "a large and ongoing scheme, albeit a single scheme," to escape
RICO liability. Id. (quoting Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975
(7th Cir. 1986)).
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function that no threat of continuity exists. I 10 Therefore, according to
the reasoning of the court, the single instance of bribery in Roeder could
not become a pattern merely because it was carried out in several steps
and was communicated through a series of letters and phone calls. Il
4. Approaches Unchanged by Sedima (Second, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits)
The Second, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have not significantly
changed their interpretations of the pattern requirement following the
Supreme Court's comments on the subject in Sedima. The Second and
the Fifth Circuits continue to hold, as they did prior to Sedima, that two
predicate acts suffice to constitute a pattern. 1 2 The extent to which the
Eleventh Circuit follows Sedima is uncertain, but it has retained its rule
that separate predicate acts are considered to be distinct in determining
whether a pattern exists, irrespective of whether they occurred as part of
a single scheme or transaction.' 13
a. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit has taken the position that its interpretation of
the pattern requirement, established prior to Sedima, need not be altered
to conform with Sedima. 1 4 In United States v. lanniello, the court affirmed
110. See Roeder, 814 F.2d at 31 (citing Marks v. Forster, 811 F.2d 1108 (7th
Cir. 1987)).
111. Id. According to the court, a bribe is "solitary and isolated" and can-
not be transformed into a pattern just by multiple acts of communication. Id.
The court stated: "This is especially true when the acts involve wire and mail
fraud. 'In today's integrated interstate economy, it is the rare transaction that
does not somehow rely on extensive use of the mails or the telephone.' " Id.
(quoting Eastern Corp. Fed. Credit Union v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 639
F. Supp. 1532, 1535 (D. Mass 1986)).
112. See, e.g., United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 189-93 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc., v. Hyatt, 774
F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of lanniello, see infra notes
114-18 and accompanying text. For a discussion of R.A.G.S., see infra notes 119-
23 and accompanying text.
113. See Bank of Am. v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11 th Cir. 1986).
For a discussion of Bank of America, see infra notes 124-27 and accompanying
text.
114. See United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 189-93 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987). In lanniello, the court declined to reconsider
United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871(1980), which held that two predicate acts suffice to establish a pattern. Ianniello,
808 F.2d at 189-90. In the Second Circuit one panel is bound by the decision of
a prior panel until overruled by the Supreme Court or by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit en banc. Id. at 190 (citing In rejaylaw
Drug, Inc., 621 F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1980); Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d
661, 663-64 (2d Cir. 1979)). Since the Supreme Court's comments in Sedima
were dicta, the court found it unnecessary to reconsider the earlier decision. Id.
Furthermore, the court stated that it would be inappropriate to do so because
Weisman addressed the same concerns addressed in Sedima, including the ele-
ments of continuity and relationship. Id. (citing Weisman, 624 F.2d at 1121-23).
226 [Vol. 33: p. 205
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that two predicate acts will suffice to establish a pattern.' 15 The court
held that continuity and relationship among the predicate acts are sup-
plied through its definition of the "enterprise" requirement.' 16 In the
Second Circuit, an enterprise must be a continuing operation and the
acts must be related to the common purpose of the enterprise.' 17 Thus,
the difference between the Second Circuit's interpretation of pattern
and Sedima "is one of form and not of substance."' 18
115. 808 F.2d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Weisman,
642 F.2d 1118, 1121-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980)), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987). lanniello involved a large group of defendants who
skimmed profits from bars and restaurants they owned in New York. Id. at 186.
The criminal scheme included plans to defraud the state of taxes by understating
gross receipts, to defraud legitimate creditors of one of the bars by skimming
receipts while it was in bankruptcy and to cheat on their personal income tax
returns. Id. The predicate acts alleged were multiple acts of mail and bank-
ruptcy fraud. Id. at 189. The court held that proof of two or more predicate acts
satisfied the pattern requirement. Id. at 190. Furthermore, since the jury was
instructed that the acts must be related to the enterprise and that the enterprise
must be a continuous operation, any failure to charge the jury in exactly the
language of Sedima would have been harmless error at best. Id. at 191.
116. Id. at 192. Under the lanniello court's analysis, relatedness is supplied
by the requirement that all the predicate acts occur within a ten year period, as
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), as well as by the requirement that they be com-
mitted in connection with an enterprise, as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). See
lanniello, 808 F.2d at 190 (citing United States v. Weisman, 642 F.2d 1118, 1121-
23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980)). The enterprise also provides con-
tinuity because "an enterprise is a continuing operation." Id. at 190-91 (citing
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); Moss v. Morgan Stanley
Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983)). For an
explanation of the enterprise requirement, see supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
117. lanniello, 808 F.2d at 191 (citing Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d
5, 21-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); United States v. Mazzei, 700
F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983)).
118. Id. (footnote omitted). One of the defendants in Ianniello put forth the
argument that the two predicate acts which he was convicted of could not consti-
tute a pattern because they were both designed to further a single discrete
crime, fraudulent renewal of the license for a bar. Id. The court rejected this
argument in accord with its holding that two predicate acts can constitute a pat-
tern. Id. The court recognized that under its approach, continuing criminal ac-
tivity with a single purpose can provide a basis for RICO liability. Id. The court
noted that the Eighth Circuit in Superior Oil v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th
Cir. 1986), had reached a contrary result by holding that more than one scheme
was required to constitute a pattern. lanniello, 808 F.2d at 192. The court stated
that the requirement of more than one scheme was "a strained and inappropri-
ate reading of the statutory language." Id. In addition, the court noted that
such a requirement would undercut section 1962(b) of RICO which prohibits
predicate acts designed to take over an enterprise. As the court stated, section
1962(b) "prohibits one scheme to acquire an interest in an interstate enter-
prise." Id. Requiring two schemes for the same purpose "would effectively
eliminate this provision." Id. (footnote omitted).
In a subsequent case, Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d
46 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 698 (1988), the Second Circuit reaf-
firmed the analysis of lanniello and once again rejected the contention that a
pattern requires more than one criminal scheme. Beck, 820 F.2d at 51. How-
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b. Fifth Circuit
R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc., v. Hyatt set the precedent for the pattern re-
quirement in the Fifth Circuit.' 19 The R.A.G.S. court held that two acts
of mail fraud aimed at obtaining a single payment constituted a pat-
tern. 120 R.A.G.S. represents the same approach the Fifth Circuit took
prior to Sedima; any two acts can constitute a pattern. 1 2 Other panels in
the Fifth Circuit have questioned R.A.G.S. and urged that it be over-
ever, the court held that the enterprise element was not satisfied because the
alleged enterprise had only a single shortlived goal. Id. Therefore, the con-
tinuity element required for an enterprise was not established and the RICO
claim was dismissed. Id. at 51-52; see also Creative Bath Prods., Inc. v. Connecti-
cut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 837 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir. 1988) (complaint dismissed
because entity was short lived and thus lacked continuity); United States v. Bene-
vento, 836 F.2d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 1987) (continuity element met where enterprise
was long and elaborate); Albany Ins. Co. v. Esses, 831 F.2d 41,44 (2d Cir. 1987)
(continuity element not met where enterprise had obvious date of termination).
Similarly, in Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1987), the RICO claim
was dismissed because the enterprise had been dissolved and thus did not dis-
play the requisite continuity. Id. at 902-03. The dissent criticized this result
because the enterprise was dissolved after the criminal activity complained of
was completed. Id. (Pratt, J., dissenting). The dissent also criticized Beck for
equating the alleged criminal activity with the enterprise. Id. (Pratt, J., dissent-
ing). By equating the two, and then requiring that the enterprise have more
than a single goal, the court in Beck created a requirement of two schemes, which
had been rejected in lanniello. Id. (Pratt, J., dissenting). Therefore, according to
the dissent, the result of Beck was that it made a "mess" of the RICO decisions in
the district courts of the Second Circuit. Id. (Pratt, J., dissenting).
119. 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985).
120. Id. R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc., a clothing manufacturer, sued its former
president, Hyatt, and another individual, Wellborne, for allegedly trying to de-
fraud it by twice mailing false invoices regarding sewing machine rentals. Id. at
1352. There was a dispute as to whether R.A.G.S. or Wellborne owned the sew-
ing machines in question. Id. The predicate acts alleged in the complaint were
two acts of mail fraud, one for the mailing of repair and rental invoices, and the
other for mailing a demand for payment. Id.
The defendants argued that in light of Sedima the two predicate acts did not
constitute a pattern. Id. at 1355. The court replied: "We are not persuaded by
the defendant's argument. The Supreme Court in Sedima implied that two 'iso-
lated' acts would not constitute a pattern. In this case, however, the alleged acts
of mail fraud are related." Id. (citation omitted).
The court's reasoning that acts which are related are not isolated differs
from the view taken by other circuits. Other circuits take the view that the two
aspects present entirely different issues. See, e.g., Sun Savings, 825 F.2d at 192-94
(equating "not isolated" with continuity, distinct from "relationship"). Further-
more, since relationship among the predicate acts is virtually never in contro-
versy, see id. at 192, even if R.A.G.S stands for the proposition that the predicate
acts must be related, the effect is that almost any two acts will constitute a
pattern.
121. In Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.
1987), the court stated: "Before Sedima, we had not attempted to define fully the
meaning of pattern. An imaginative plaintiff could take virtually any illegal oc-
currence and point to acts preparatory to the occurrence, usually the use of the
telephone or mails, as meeting the requirement of pattern." Id. at 424 (citation
omitted).
228
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turned in favor of a rule that predicate acts which are merely preparatory
to a single offense do not constitute a pattern. 122 However, because of
that circuit's policy that one panel cannot overturn another, R.A. G. S. re-
mains the rule.12 3
c. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit, in Bank of America v. Touche Ross & Co., reaf-
firmed its pre-Sedima view that separate violations of the state and fed-
eral statutes in question are considered distinct predicate acts,
regardless of whether they occur as part of the same scheme or transac-
tion. 124 The court in Bank of America noted that because the predicate
acts in question were separate violations of the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes, they satisfied the Eleventh Circuit's definition of pattern. 125 The
122. See, e.g., Crocker v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 348 n.2
(5th Cir. 1987); Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 424-26
(5th Cir. 1987); Cowan v. Corley, 814 F.2d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1987); Smoky
Greenhaw Cotton v. Merrill Lynch, 785 F.2d 1274, 1280-81 n.7 (5th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3211 (1987).
In Smoky Greenhaw, the court suggested that the pattern issue was an open
question and stated that "the Supreme Court appeared to challenge the lower
courts to develop a more rigorous interpretation of 'pattern.' " Smoky Greenhaw,
785 F.2d at 1280-81 n.7. In Cowan, the pattern issue was once again referred to
as if it were an open question; the court stated that "[w]e read this language in
Sedima to direct a narrower interpretation of pattern than has sometimes been
employed." Cowan, 814 F.2d at 227 (footnote omitted).
In Montesano, however, the court declined to adopt a rule that acts prepara-
tory to a discrete offense cannot constitute a pattern. Montesano, 818 F.2d at
426. The case involved a RICO claim based upon a single illegal repossession of
a boat where the predicate acts consisted of telephone calls (wire fraud) during
the repossession. Id. at 424. The court emphasized that in light of the legisla-
tive purpose of RICO, the activity at hand should not be considered a pattern,
but declared that R.A.G.S. "blocks this path." Id. at 426. In a subsequent case
the correctness of the R.A.G.S. approach was again questioned. Crocker v. Fed-
eral Deposit Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 348 n.2 (5th Cir. 1987).
123. See Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 425-26
(5th Cir. 1987). The court stated:
[O]ur rule that one panel cannot overturn another serves a somewhat
different purpose of institutional orderliness, a distinction evidenced by
our insistence that, in the absence of intervening Supreme Court prece-
dent, one panel cannot overturn another panel, regardless of how
wrong the earlier panel decision may seem to be. Equally significant,
drawing too fine a distinction here would invite further confusion in an
already troubled subject.
Id.
124. 782 F.2d 966, 971 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (citing U.S. v. Watchmaker, 761
F.2d 1459, 1475 (11 th Cir. 1985)). The plaintiffs in Bank of America were five
banks which sued Touche Ross, an accounting firm, on the basis of an allegedly
fraudulent audit. Id. at 968. The alleged predicate acts were nine incidents of
mail and wire fraud engaged in for the purpose of inducing the banks to extend
credit to a venture which later failed. Id. at 971.
125. Id. The court quoted ll'atchmaker:
The standard which has been applied in this Circuit is whether each act
constitutes 'a separate violation of the [state or federal] statute' go'-
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court also stated that the predicate acts satisfied the definition of pattern
in 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e), which the Supreme Court quoted in Sedima. 12 6
While it noted the Supreme Court's comments on pattern, however, the
court in Bank of America did not explicitly state how those comments af-
fected its definition of pattern. In the only subsequent Eleventh Circuit
case which considered the pattern requirement, the court stated that
Sedima "does not necessarily change this circuit's rule."' 127 Therefore,
the effect of Sedima upon the pattern requirement in the Eleventh Circuit
remains somewhat of a mystery, at least until that circuit is faced directly
with the issue.
III. ANALYSIS
The current state of conflict among the federal courts of appeals
over the pattern requirement in civil RICO raises several issues regard-
ing the development of the civil RICO action. First, under what circum-
stances do the various interpretations of pattern give different results?
Next, have the federal courts of appeals reconciled a restrictive interpre-
tation of the pattern requirement with the statutory mandate that RICO
be "liberally construed," and if so, which interpretation best reconciles
these competing objectives? 128 Finally, what does the development of
the pattern requirement mean for the future of civil RICO?
A. The Practical Significance of the Different Interpretations
In this section, the different interpretations of the pattern require-
ment are compared and analyzed with the objective of demonstrating
how and under what circumstances they lead to different results. The
interpretations are examined through a series of hypothetical models.
These models of basic factual situations represent a situation where the
predicate acts demonstrate very little relationship, a situation where they
present very little continuity and a situation where they present substan-
tial continuity but only one criminal scheme. Logically, the next basic
factual situation would be a situation where there is a significant degree
erning the conduct in question .... If distinct statutory violations are
found, the predicate acts will be considered to be distinct irrespective
of the circumstances under which they arose.
Id. (quoting U.S. v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1475 (11 th Cir. 1985)).
126. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) states in pertinent part: "[C]riminal conduct
forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar pur-
poses, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." Bank
of America, 782 F.2d at 971 (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14). The complaint
satisfied the pattern requirement under Sedima because the predicate acts in-
volved the same parties over a three year period and all were aimed at the same
purpose. Id.
127. United States v. Hobson, 825 F,2d 364, 366 n.2 (11 th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3592 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1987) (No. 87-1051).
128. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
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of continuity and multiple schemes. In that situation, however, a pattern
would be established regardless of the interpretation used. Therefore,
it is only necessary to examine the first three situations.
Model A
Consider the following: In 1979 an executive of corporation C
fraudulently conceals material corporate information in connection with
a securities offering. Then in 1985 a different executive of corporation
C commits wire fraud in connection with a sales transaction. Assume
that all the elements for a civil RICO action have been established ex-
cept for the pattern requirement.
The predicate acts in this model are completely unrelated because
the victims, perpetrators, results and method of commission are all dif-
ferent.1 29 Therefore, under any interpretation of pattern based on the
Sedima formulation of continuity and relationship, the complaint would
be dismissed.' 30 The court would never need to reach the continuity
aspect.
The outcome would be different under the pre-Sedima approach in
which any two predicate acts within a ten year period constitute a pat-
tern.' 3 ' Thus, the facts of model A would constitute a pattern in the
Second Circuit because it flatly rejects Sedima. 13 2 The Fifth and Elev-
enth Circuits have not clearly stated their positions in regard to Sedima,
but have not renounced their pre-Sedima views that any two acts can con-
stitute a pattern.' 3 3 Therefore, a strong argument could be made in
these circuits that the facts of model A should not constitute a pattern
because Congress could not have intended the severe penalties of civil
RICO to apply where the predicate acts are completely unrelated.134
129. See, e.g., Sun Savings, 825 F.2d 187. The Sun Savings court stated "rela-
tionship exists among acts that have 'the same or similar purposes, results, par-
ticipants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics.'" Id. at 192 (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496
n. 14). For a discussion of the relationship aspect, see supra note 56 and accom-
panying text.
130. Interpretations of pattern based on Sedima include the two-scheme ap-
proach, the flexible approach and the not-isolated approach. For a discussion of
the two-scheme approach, see supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the flexible approach, see supra notes 74-95 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the not-isolated approach, see supra notes 96-111 and
accompanying text.
131. For a discussion of the pre-Sedima view that any two acts constitute a
pattern, see supra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.132. See Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184. For a discussion of Ianniello, see supra notes
108-11 and accompanying text.
133. See Bank of America, 782 F.2d 966; R.A.G.S., 774 F.2d 1350. For a dis-
cussion of R.A.G.S., see supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of Bank of America, see supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
134. The Senate Report states that: "one isolated 'racketeering activity'
was thought insufficient to trigger the remedies provided under the proposed
chapter, largely because the net would be too large and the remedies dispropor-
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Model B
Consider the following: An executive of corporation C cheats a cus-
tomer by conducting a single fraudulent sales transaction. The deal
takes place over a two month period and during this time the executive
communicates with the customer three times over the phone and twice
by mail. Assume that all of the elements for a civil RICO action have
been established except for the pattern requirement.
This situation is different from model A because these predicate
acts of mail and wire fraud are clearly related; the criminal activity in-
volved the same perpetrator, transaction and victim. The next step
under any approach that follows Sedima is to determine whether there is
sufficient continuity for a pattern.
A complaint based upon the facts of model B would be dismissed
under the two-scheme approach because all of the predicate acts fur-
thered a single scheme to defraud a single customer. 135 Under the not-
isolated approach, it would be necessary to determine whether the pred-
icate acts posed a threat of continuing activity. 136 Because the facts of
model B involve only a single victim and objective and the predicate acts
completed the fraudulent scheme, the criminal activity would be consid-
ered isolated with no threat of continuity present.' 37 The complaint
would therefore be dismissed. Under the flexible approach the extent of
the criminal activity would be examined without relying on a single de-
terminative factor. 13 8 Instead, a number of factors would be consid-
ered. 139 A complaint based on model B would be dismissed under that
approach because the predicate acts are substantially similar, they oc-
curred over a relatively short period of time, they represent only a single
scheme and because there was only a single victim and perpetrator.
tionate to the gravity of the offense." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 158
(1969).
135. See, e.g., Superior Oil, 785 F.2d 252. For a discussion of Superior Oil, see
supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Sun Savings, 825 F.2d at 192. For a discussion of Sun Savings,
see supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
137. The facts in the model are substantially similar to the facts of Schrei-
ber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1399 (9th Cir.
1986), where the complaint was dismissed for lack of a pattern. For a discussion
of Schreiber, see supra note 106.
138. See, e.g., Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 39; Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975. For a
discussion of Barticheck, see supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of Morgan, see supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 38-39 ("existence of a RICO pattern
[turns on] a combination of specific factors such as the number of unlawful acts,
the length of time over which the acts were committed, the similarity of the acts,
the number of perpetrators, and the character of the unlawful activity"); 11opgan,
804 F.2d at 975 ("Relevant factors include the number and variety of predicate
acts and the length of time over which they were committed, the number of
victims, the presence of separate schemes and the occurrence of distinct
injuries.").
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A pattern would be established on the facts of model B under the
pre-Sedima approach because there were more than two predicate acts
within a ten year period.140 Under this interpretation of pattern, state
law fraud is automatically bootstrapped into a federal offense just be-
cause the defendants used the telephone and the mails in the course of
their criminal activity. A similar result would be reached with regard to
any single crime which is perpetrated by the commission of multiple acts
of mail and wire fraud.
Model C
Consider the following: Corporation C sells chemicals in tanks and
drums. Executives of corporation C devise and carry out a plan to in-
crease the corporation's profits by systematically cheating a customer
out of a large amount of chemicals over a long period of time. They
achieve this by slightly underfilling each drum delivered to the cus-
tomer. This fraudulent scheme continues for five years before the cus-
tomer is tipped off and sues on RICO charges. The predicate acts which
the customer alleges include multiple acts of mail and wire fraud. These
represent fraudulent invoices and telephone calls between the customer
and corporation C during the time the illegal activity was occurring. As-
sume that all of the elements for a civil RICO action have been estab-
lished except for the pattern requirement.
There is no problem of relationship among the predicate acts in this
model. The sole question is whether it presents the requisite continuity
for a pattern. An analysis of the model under the two-scheme approach
leads inexorably to the conclusion that a pattern would not be estab-
lished on these facts because the criminal activity represents but a single
scheme to defraud a single customer. 14 '
A pattern would be established on the facts of model C under the
not-isolated approach because the situation posed a threat of continuing
activity; the predicate acts occurred over a long period of time and
would have continued indefinitely if the customer had not been
warned. 14 2 Similarly, under the flexible approach a pattern would be
established on the facts of model C because of the extent of the criminal
activity. The existence of multiple perpetrators and multiple predicate
140. See, e.g., lanniello, 808 F.2d 184; Bank ofAmerica, 782 F.2d 966; R.A.G.S.,
774 F.2d 1350. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 112-27 and ac-
companying text. Note that in model A there was some discrepancy as to
whether a pattern would have been established in the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits. There would not be the same issue in regard to model B because both
circuits have held that a pattern was stated under similar circumstances. See Bank
of America, 782 F.2d at 971; R.A.G.S., 774 F.2d at 1355.
141. See Superior Oil, 785 F.2d 252. For a discussion of Superior Oil, see supra
notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
142. See Sun Savings, 825 F.2d at 192 ("The four predicate acts in this case
did pose a threat of continuing activity because they . . . occurred over several
months, and in no way completed the criminal scheme.").
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acts occurring over a substantial period of time far outweigh the fact that
there was only a single scheme and a single victim. 143
What this comparison shows is that the various interpretations
often lead to the same result. In a situation such as model A, where
there is little relationship between the predicate acts, the complaint
would be dismissed for lack of a pattern if the circuit follows Sedima.
Conversely, if the circuit does not follow Sedima, the pattern require-
ment will be satisfied. In a situation such as model B, where a small
degree of continuity is present, the outcome will, again, depend entirely
on whether the circuit follows Sedima. A circuit which follows Sedima
would not find a pattern and a circuit which takes the pre-Sedima ap-
proach would find a pattern. But in a situation such as model C, where
there is a substantial amount of continuity present but only a single
scheme, a pattern would be established under any interpretation except
the two-scheme approach. This leads to the conclusion that in terms of
results there are only a few basic differences between the approaches.
As the next section explains, however, there are other significant
differences.
B. Reconciling Sedima With RICO's Liberal Construction Clause
To ensure RICO's effectiveness, Congress included in the statute a
clause which states that "the provisions of this title shall be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes."' 14 4 The importance of this
clause was demonstrated in Sedima where the Supreme Court invalidated
the judicially created restrictions at issue, in part because they repre-
sented a narrow construction of RICO. 14 5 Therefore, the Sedima sug-
gestion that the lower federal courts develop an effective interpretation
of the pattern requirement must be implemented with the liberal con-
struction clause in mind. The split among the federal courts of appeals
over the pattern requirement is proof that this has not been easy. Jus-
tice Powell predicted that this would be a problem when he stated in
dissent in Sedima that "[t]he Court has read the entire statute so broadly
that it will be difficult, if not impossible, for courts to adopt a reading of
'pattern' that will conform to the intention of Congress."' 14 6
This section of this Note will examine the strengths and weaknesses
of the various approaches and will focus in particular on how well each
interpretation has reconciled a restrictive and useful interpretation of
pattern with a liberal reading of the statute.
One advantage of the two-scheme approach is that it is the most
143. See Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 39. The facts of Barticheck also involved a
significant amount of criminal activity which nonetheless constituted a single
scheme. Id.
144. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
145. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488-500.
146. Id. at 528 (Powell,J., dissenting). For a discussion of Justice Powell's
dissent, see supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
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effective interpretation in terms of restricting the uses of civil RICO. As
demonstrated in model C above, the pattern requirement is not met
under the two-scheme approach even where other approaches would
clearly find a pattern. Indeed, the most prevalent single criticism of the
two-scheme approach is that it is too restrictive; it would allow a large,
ongoing single scheme to escape RICO liability. 14 7 In addition to being
the most effective in terms of limiting civil RICO, the two-scheme ap-
proach is also the easiest interpretation to apply; it is a bright line test.
This functional practicability cannot be credited to the existence of a
concise workable definition of scheme; no court employing the two-
scheme approach has yet developed such a definition. Instead, the ease
of application seems to result from the fact that scheme is easily
conceptualized.
There is, however, the possibility that any criminal activity could be
broken up and analyzed as involving multiple schemes. This possibility
itself demonstrates a problem with the two-scheme approach which un-
dercuts the benefits of the approach. The fraudulent shipments de-
scribed in model C, for example, could each be considered a separate
scheme. This type of analysis would destroy the bright line quality of
the two-scheme approach and thus diminish one of the strengths of the
two-scheme approach, its ease of application. Furthermore, it would be-
come necessary to define exactly what constitutes a scheme. At that
point, the problem of defining scheme would have been substituted for
the problem of defining pattern. 148
The most significant problem with the two-scheme approach, how-
ever, is unrelated to the conceptual and practical difficulties which it
presents. Its main flaw is that it violates the liberal construction clause
of RICO by relying on a single determinative factor which is not found
in the language or legislative history of the statute. This interpretation
comes too close to recommitting the sins of the restrictive interpreta-
tions which were invalidated in Sedima.
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the two-scheme approach
is the pre-Sedima view that any two acts within a ten year period consti-
tute a pattern.i 49 In reality, this is not an interpretation of pattern at all
because it reads the requirement right out of the statute. The pre-Sedima
view is the least suitable approach to the pattern requirement because it
does nothing to restrict and control civil RICO and thus ignores the
guidance of Sedima.
In between these two extreme approaches, however, lie the flexible
147. See, e.g., Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975. For a discussion of this reason for
rejecting the two-scheme approach, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
148. The Third Circuit made these observations in Petro-Tech, Inc. v.
Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1354-55 (3d Cir. 1987). For a discussion
of Petro-Tech, see supra note 84 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., lanniello, 808 F.2d 184; Bank of America, 782 F.2d 966; R.A.G.S.,
774 F.2d 1350.
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and not-isolated approaches. 150 These two interpretations are proof
that it is possible to reconcile a broad reading of RICO with a restrictive
interpretation of pattern. The analytical models used in the previous
section demonstrated that the flexible, not-isolated and two-scheme ap-
proaches all limit civil RICO but of the three, the two-scheme approach
is the most effective. While the flexible and not-isolated approaches are
somewhat less effective, this slight deficiency is outweighed by the com-
patibility of both approaches with a liberal construction of the statute.
This is true because neither approach relies on a single determinative
factor or upon a limitation not rooted in the language or legislative his-
tory of the statute.15 Instead, they further the remedial purposes of the
statute by focusing on the facts of each case on an individual basis to
determine if the extent of the criminal activity rises to the level of a
pattern. 152
This is not meant to suggest, however, that the not-isolated and
flexible approaches are completely alike. The internal logic of the two
interpretations is quite different. The not-isolated approach does not
accept continuity and relationship as the basis of "pattern."' 53 Rather,
the focus is on whether the predicate acts represent "isolated" activ-
ity.' 54 This in turn depends on whether there is a threat of continuing
activity. 155 This analysis is logically consistent, but it does not offer
much in the way of guidance to the lower courts.
The flexible approach, on the other hand, is an easier concept to
apply, especially as it is used by the Third and Seventh Circuits. It re-
quires a case by case examination of the criminal activity in order to
determine whether the requisite continuity and relationship for a pat-
tern are demonstrated.15 6 Furthermore, the Third and Seventh Circuits
strengthen the analysis conceptually by focusing on a set of specific fac-
tors, no one of which is determinative. 15 7
The flexible approach is the most suitable interpretation of pattern,
not only because it best reconciles a restrictive interpretation of pattern
150. For a discussion of the not-isolated approach, see supra notes 96-111
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the two-scheme approach, see supra
notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
151. See Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 38-40; Sun Savings, 825 F.2d.at 194; Morgan,
804 F.2d at 975-76.
152. See Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 40 ("This determination [of continuity] nec-
essarily depends on -the circumstances of the particular case"); Sun Savings, 825
F.2d at 194 ("[W]e prefer simply to examine the predicate acts to see whether
they are in fact isolated or sporadic."); Morgan, 804 F.2d at 976 ("determination
[of pattern] depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case").
153. See Sun Savings, 825 F.2d at 192.
154. Id. at 194.
155. Id.
156. See Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 38-39; Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975-76.
157. See Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 38; Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975.
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with the liberal construction clause, but also because it presents a simple
and straightforward analysis.
C. What the Development of the Pattern Requirement Means
for the Future of Civil RICO
The experience of the Third and Seventh Circuits with the flexible
interpretation of pattern is proof that the pattern requirement in civil
RICO is working. The two-scheme and not-isolated approaches, despite
their flaws, also demonstrate that the pattern requirement can work. All
of these interpretations are eliminating civil RICO claims based on iso-
lated and unrelated criminal activity.
Civil RICO claims are, of course, still being brought against legiti-
mate businesses. Critics may call for an even more restrictive interpreta-
tion of civil RICO because the title and purpose of the Act state that
RICO was intended to be used against organized crime.1 58 This criti-
cism fails to recognize that the statute does not define organized crime.
The statute does, however, state the requirements for a civil RICO
claim. If the defendant participated in criminal activity, and all the re-
quirements for civil RICO are satisfied, then liability properly results
regardless of whether the defendant is a legitimate business.
Conversely, there may be critics who argue that a restrictive inter-
pretation of pattern is inconsistent with the express statutory definition
of pattern and with RICO's liberal construction clause. Such criticism is
dispelled by a careful reading of footnote fourteen of Sedima which is
based directly on the language and legislative history of RICO. Further-
more, giving meaning to every element of the statute as Congress in-
tended is in no way inconsistent with the liberal construction clause.
In 1986, a bill was defeated in the Senate that would have changed
several aspects of civil RICO, including the definition of pattern. 59 The
relevant portion of the bill stated that a pattern would require at least
two predicate acts which "are not so closely related in time and place
that they constitute a single episode." 6 This would not have been a
useful addition to the present definition of pattern. It would have sim-
ply created a new definitional problem and caused intense judicial spec-
ulation about what constitute an "episode." Furthermore, it would have
created confusion about the relationship of the new definition to the
Supreme Court's comments in Sedima. Therefore, unless Congress
wishes to overhaul the entire civil RICO action, it would be best not to
change the statutory definition of pattern. 16
1
158. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 524 (Powell, J., dissenting).
159. H.R. 5445, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1986).
160. Id.
161. Prior to Sedima, the Ad Hoc Civil Rico Task Force of the ABA made
several recommendations regarding the future of civil RICO. Included were
recommendations that courts give greater meaning to the pattern requirement
and that Congress consider amending the definition of pattern. The report
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The principal reason for not amending the statute in a piecemeal
fashion is that the courts are still responding to the Supreme Court's
guidance in Sedima, and are bringing civil RICO into a state of equilib-
rium without an amendment. Moreover, since a majority of circuits are
effectively reigning in civil RICO, any amendment at this time jeopar-
dizes the progress that has been made and threatens to create further
confusion and less predictability.
IV. CONCLUSION
The pattern requirement in civil RICO is working, at least in those
circuits which have followed the seminal comments of the Supreme
Court in Sedima.1 62 By developing restrictive interpretations of pattern,
these circuits are foreclosing the opportunity to litigate civil RICO
claims which are based on isolated and unrelated predicate acts, thus
fulfilling the intent of Congress.
All the interpretations of pattern which follow Sedima have merit,
but the best interpretation is the flexible approach as used by the Third
and Seventh Circuits. This interpretation effectively restricts the use of
civil RICO and is consistent with a liberal construction of the statute.
Moreover, it is analytically simple, which means that it is easy to apply
and that it contributes to predictability in civil RICO litigation.
The statute does not need to be amended to prevent civil RICO
from being misused. In enacting RICO, Congress clearly intended the
pattern requirement to serve a limiting function.163 All that is required
to vindicate the statutory scheme is for the federal courts of appeals to
unify behind a single restrictive interpretation of pattern.
Stephen G. Harvey
noted, however, that giving greater meaning to the pattern requirement might
obviate the need for an amendment. See ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-15.
162. For a discussion of the approaches taken by the federal courts of ap-
peals, see supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
163. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14; ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at 193-94.
238 [Vol. 33: p. 205
34
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss1/5
